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INTRODUCTION

Eighty years after the U.S. Supreme Court said that zoning
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1

does not violate property owners’ constitutional due process rights,
municipal land-use planning is still a thicket that can trap the
unwitting property owner, city council member, or judge. On one
side of that thicket, planning devices are a legitimate exercise of
2
government police power because they serve the public welfare.
3
On the other side, planners and officials sometimes “go too far”
and impermissibly interfere with private property rights. A recent
Minnesota Supreme Court case required justices to wade in and
4
decide on which side of the hedge a comprehensive plan falls.
5
The case, Mendota Golf LLP v. City of Mendota Heights, involved
the owners of a private golf course itching to sell to a developer,
who would replace the links with a low-density housing
development. The City of Mendota Heights refused to change its
6
comprehensive plan to allow the development. There was a twist:
the comprehensive plan did not allow housing on the site, but the
7
city’s zoning ordinance did. The immediate issue that confronted
the Minnesota Supreme Court was whether the city was obligated
to change the comprehensive plan so that it matched the zoning
8
ordinance—and thus allow the housing development. The court
decided that the city could not be forced to change the
9
comprehensive plan.
While the golf course was tiny, the stakes were huge—the
entire Twin Cities regional planning scheme was at issue, some
10
claimed. Yet for a case with such weighty implications, its path to
1. See Vill. of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926) (holding that
the zoning ordinance was a reasonable extension of the village's police power and
did not have the character of arbitrary fiat, and thus was not unconstitutional).
2. See AM. PLANNING ASS’N, POLICY GUIDE ON TAKINGS 3–4 (1995), http://
www.planning.org/policyguides/pdf/Takings.pdf.
3. David L. Callies, Takings: An Introduction and Overview, 24 U. HAW. L. REV.
441, 443 (2002).
4. See Mendota Golf, LLP v. City of Mendota Heights, 708 N.W.2d 162
(Minn. 2006).
5. 708 N.W.2d 162 (Minn. 2006).
6. Id. at 170.
7. Id. at 167–68.
8. Id. at 166.
9. Id.
10. David Peterson, Land-Use Ruling May Have Wider Effect Across Metro, STAR
TRIB. (Minneapolis), Jan. 23, 2006, at 3B (quoting city attorney calling the ruling a
“major opinion reinforcing the legitimacy of a community's desire to preserve
open and recreational spaces as part of an overall land-use plan”); Community
Rights Report, CRC’S MONTHLY NEWSLETTER (Community Rts. Couns., Wash. D.C.),
Jan. 2006, at 1, http://www.communityrights.org/PDFs/Newsletters/Jan2006.pdf
(last visited Jan. 9, 2007) (hailing decision as “clear reaffirmation of
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the courthouse was surprisingly marred by mistakes and confusion.
Nearly every entity in the case stumbled. The city failed to
reconcile its comprehensive plan and zoning ordinance despite a
11
12
state mandate, left puzzling language in its comprehensive plan,
and passed a vaguely worded resolution in turning away the
13
developers. The landowner overpaid for its property, operated a
money-losing business there for eight years, and nodded off while
14
its ox was gored by the legislature and the city. The legislature,
meanwhile, kept things interesting by flip-flopping—twice—the
15
legal hierarchy of planning and zoning.
This note first traces the development of land-use law in the
United States generally and Minnesota specifically, with an
emphasis on smart-growth controls that—especially since 1995—
16
enhanced the status of the comprehensive plan. Then the note
17
examines the supreme court’s decision in Mendota Golf, followed
18
by an analysis of the ruling. The note observes that the supreme
court opted to protect the comprehensive plan because of its
importance in the Twin Cities’ regional land-use planning system,
while leaving the door open for the landowners to return with a
19
federal or state constitutional takings claim. The note concludes
that if the landowners do mount a takings challenge, they likely
20
would not succeed.
Because comprehensive planning is a
legitimate use of the state’s police powers, because it plays a key
role in the Twin Cities’ regional planning structure, and because
Mendota Heights went about its planning in a rational way, the
21
city’s actions did not “go too far.”
comprehensive planning for the promotion of the health, safety, and quality of life
of our communities”).
11. Mendota Golf, 708 N.W.2d at 170–71.
12. Id. at 171.
13. See id. at 180.
14. Brief of Appellant City of Mendota Heights at 8–9, Mendota Golf, 708
N.W.2d 162 (Minn. 2006) (No. A04-0206), 2005 WL 3816935.
15. Mendota Golf, 708 N.W.2d 166–67; see infra Part II.C.
16. See infra Part II.
17. See infra Part III.
18. See infra Part IV.
19. U.S. CONST. amend. V (providing that “private property [shall not] be
taken for public use without just compensation”); MINN. CONST. art. I, § 13
("[p]rivate property shall not be taken, destroyed or damaged for public use
without just compensation").
20. See infra Part IV.
21. See Penn. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (setting out Justice Oliver
Wendell Holmes’s now-famous exposition that “while property may be regulated
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II. HISTORY
22

Like Jacob and Esau in the Bible, planning and zoning have
had a long and complicated sibling rivalry. In both cases, the birth
order was controversial; in both cases, troubles were not far behind.
A. Planning and Zoning: Early Missteps
The roots of the conflict trace to the dawn of zoning in the late
23
19th century. The factories of the industrial revolution belched
out air and noise pollution, and cities grew congested with
24
workers. But neighbors trying to protect their interests against
these modern plagues had only the inadequate tools of common25
law nuisance and servitude doctrines. Reform-minded thinkers—
who would become the first city planners—stepped forward in
England and America with proposals they argued would prevent
26
the harmful effects wrought by industrial society. Their answer
was zoning.
American social reformers, adapting their ideas from the
27
earlier proposal of an English author, seized on four underlying
principles that would animate modern city planning: separation of
uses, protection of the single-family home, low-rise development,
28
and medium-density of population.
Proponents believed these
principles would protect the public health, safety, welfare, and
29
morals. “[Z]oning means better homes and an increase of health,
comfort and happiness for all the people,” said planner Robert H.

to a certain extent, if regulation goes too far it will be recognized as a taking”).
22. Genesis 25:24–26. Esau came out of Rebecca’s womb first, followed by
Jacob, holding onto his brother’s heel. Id. at 25:26.
23. See JESSE DUKEMINIER & JAMES E. KRIER, PROPERTY 951–52 (5th ed. 2002).
24. Id.; JULIAN CONRAD JUERGENSMEYER & THOMAS E. ROBERTS, LAND USE
PLANNING AND CONTROL LAW 16–22 (1998).
25. DUKEMINIER & KRIER, supra note 23, at 951.
26. Id. at 952–955.
27. Ebenezer Howard, appalled by the sprawling chaos of London, proposed
a new type of town known as a Garden City, which would be built in the
countryside to give people ample space for healthy lives, and would separate the
“wholesome” suburban-style homes from commerce, industry, and homes that
would shelter “waifs,” “inebriates,” and the insane. DUKEMINIER & KRIER, supra
note 23, at 952, referencing Ebenezer Howard, TOMORROW: A PEACEFUL PATH TO
REAL REFORM (1898) (reprinted as Ebenezer Howard, GARDEN CITIES OF
TOMORROW (1902)).
28. DUKEMINIER & KRIER, supra note 23, at 953.
29. Id. at 971.

http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol33/iss2/5

4

Linsk: Property-hole-in-one for Land-use Control: Endorsing the Dominanc
6. LINSK - RC.DOC

2007]

3/7/2007 12:55:53 PM

HOLE-IN-ONE FOR LAND-USE CONTROL

631

30

Whitten.
The first municipal comprehensive zoning plan was enacted in
31
1916.
The United States Supreme Court upheld zoning’s
constitutionality in 1926, ruling that government could use its
32
Hundreds of other
police power to keep differing uses apart.
33
cities and towns quickly embraced zoning. Zoning arrived in the
34
Twin Cities of Minneapolis and St. Paul in 1922.
But there was a problem. Logically, city planning should have
35
been invented first, and then zoning. After all, first you plan, and
then you act. At least in theory, the comprehensive plan is the
vision of what a town wants to look like—a “statement of the local
36
government’s objectives and standards for development.”
The
zoning ordinance then gives effect to the comprehensive plan’s
37
vision.
Scholars have described zoning’s early dominance over
38
planning as a historical error. Zoning and planning developed on
separate tracks, spawned by two different model acts proposed by

30. William M. Randle, Professors, Reformers, Bureaucrats and Cronies: The Players
in Euclid v. Ambler, in ZONING AND THE AMERICAN DREAM 31, 39 (Charles M. Haar
& Jerold S. Kayden eds., 1989) (quoting Robert H. Whitten, Zoning and Living
Conditions, 13 PROC. NAT’L CONF. CITY PLAN. 22–23 (1921)).
31. JUERGENSMEYER & ROBERTS, supra note 24, at 22.
32. Vill. of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926).
33. JUERGENSMEYER & ROBERTS, supra note 24, at 23.
34. Larry Millett, The Deep Roots of Urban Sprawl, ST. PAUL PIONEER PRESS
(Minn.), Nov. 19, 1996, at 1A (arguing that by eliminating mixed-use
neighborhoods, zoning forced automobile use and made sprawl inevitable).
35. DANIEL R. MANDELKER, LAND USE LAW § 3.01 (5th ed. 2003).
36. DUKEMINIER & KRIER, supra note 23, at 972 (discussing the Standard State
Enabling Act, an advisory document issued in 1922 that continues to influence
states). Minnesota land use law defines the comprehensive plan as:
a compilation of policy statements, goals, standards, and maps for
guiding the physical, social and economic development, both private and
public, of the municipality and its environs, and may include, but is not
limited to, the following: statements of policies, goals, standards, a land
use plan, including proposed densities for development, a community
facilities plan, a transportation plan, and recommendations for plan
execution. A comprehensive plan represents the planning agency's
recommendations for the future development of the community.
MINN. STAT. § 462.352, subdiv. 5 (2004).
37. DUKEMINIER & KRIER, supra note 23, at 972 (citing Charles M. Haar, In
Accordance With a Comprehensive Plan, 68 HARV. L. REV. 1154, 1155 (1955)). See also
101A C.J.S. Zoning and Land Planning § 4 (2005).
38. Edward J. Sullivan & Matthew J. Michel, Ramapo Plus Thirty: The Changing
Role of the Plan in Land Use Regulation, 35 URB. LAW. 75, 83 (2003).
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39

the United States Department of Commerce. First, in 1926, came
the Standard State Zoning Enabling Act (SZEA), setting out
40
statutory authority for zoning. Two years later, the Standard City
Planning Enabling Act was released, containing statutory authority
41
The uneasy relationship
for planning and subdivision control.
between planning and zoning that continues to this day has its
roots in the model acts. Not only was their timing arguably out of
sequence, but the documents had internal problems as well. For
example, the language of the two acts, and their timing, left
unclear whether zoning had to be consistent with, or dependent
42
on, a comprehensive plan.
The zoning model act stated,
43
enigmatically, that zoning “shall be in accordance with a
44
comprehensive plan.”
A footnote in the SZEA declared, “No
45
zoning should be done without such a comprehensive study.” But
46
the planning enabling act made local planning optional.
Moreover, it appears the authors of the zoning act did not envision
enactment of a comprehensive plan in the form of an independent
47
document. In their first decades, then, zoning ordinances were
traditionally enacted without any reference to a prior or underlying
48
comprehensive municipal plan. Land-use law scholars maintain
that these early missteps laid the groundwork for an approach
49
based on short-term thinking.
39. Daniel R. Mandelker, The Role of the Local Comprehensive Plan in Land Use
Regulations, 74 MICH. L. REV. 899, 901 (1976).
40. Standard State Zoning Enabling Act (U.S. Dep’t. of Commerce rev. ed.
1926); DUKEMINIER & KRIER, supra note 23, at 959; MANDELKER, supra note 35, at §
3.13.
41. Standard City Planning Enabling Act (U.S. Dep’t of Commerce 1928);
MANDELKER, supra note 35, at § 3.05: Edward J. Sullivan, Comprehensive Planning and
Smart Growth, in TRENDS IN LAND USE LAW FROM A TO Z 177, 189 n.7 (Patricia E.
Salkin ed., 2001).
42. Mandelker, supra note 39, at 901–02.
43. HOUSING FOR ALL UNDER LAW: NEW DIRECTIONS IN HOUSING, LAND USE AND
PLANNING LAW 328 (Richard P. Fishman ed., 1978) [hereinafter HOUSING FOR
ALL].
44. Mandelker, supra note 39, at 902; Standard State Zoning Enabling Act § 3
(U.S. Dep’t of Commerce rev. ed. 1926).
45. Sullivan & Michel, supra note 38, at 75.
46. Standard City Planning Enabling Act § 2 (U.S. Dep’t of Commerce 1928);
Mandelker, Role, supra note 39, at 902; MANDELKER, supra note 35, at § 3.5.
47. MANDELKER, supra note 35, at § 3.13.
48. JUERGENSMEYER & ROBERTS, supra note 24, at 26.
49. See Sullivan & Michel, supra note 38, at 81. “[T]he history of planning and
land use regulation put zoning ahead of planning. With no driving vision for land
use, land use regulation was incoherent and unprincipled in its development,
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Even once the comprehensive plan came into vogue, aided by
50
redevelopment needs after World War II, it was still primarily
51
considered only an advisory document. Courts and legislatures
often failed to see the necessary interrelationship between zoning
52
and planning. States have varied as to how much legal weight
53
should be given to plans and whether a plan is even required.
B. Comprehensive Planning and Sprawl
Gradually, the comprehensive plan gained more than advisory
54
status, especially after a landmark article by Charles M. Haar. A
distinguished land-use scholar, Professor Haar argued that a city
should be required to have a master plan before it could exercise
55
its regulatory powers through a zoning ordinance.
More recently, states have increasingly been making the
56
comprehensive plan a legally binding document. Comprehensive
planning has become a lifeline for reformers anxious to control
57
suburban sprawl. The movement, which came to be known as
58
“smart growth,” is shorthand for a “comprehensive planning
process that preserves open space and encourages the
59
concentration of development.”
To accomplish those goals,
“[e]ach comprehensive plan must be consistent with an overall,
connected system or state and regional land use policies,” a veteran

leaving communities without the power to direct their own urbanization activities.”
Id.
50. HOUSING FOR ALL, supra note 43, at 331.
51. JUERGENSMEYER & ROBERTS, supra note 24, at 26.
52. MANDELKER, supra note 35, at § 3.1; Charles M. Haar, In Accordance with a
Comprehensive Plan, 68 HARV. L. REV. 1154, 1154 (1955).
53. Edward J. Sullivan, Recent Developments in Comprehensive Planning Law, 37
URB. LAW. 595, 595 (2005).
54. Haar, supra note 52, at 1155. See also HOUSING FOR ALL, supra note 43, at
332 (reporting a “demonstrable shift” toward Haar’s view by 1978).
55. Haar, supra note 52, at 1156.
56. Id. See also DUKEMINIER & KRIER, supra note 23, at 972 (observing that only
about half the states require comprehensive plans, “judicial attitudes [toward
them] vary greatly,” and the trend toward enforcing them “seems not to be
substantial”). The Montana Supreme Court endorsed a flexible but definite
standard in Ash Grove Cement Co. v. Jefferson County, 283 Mont. 486, 495 (1997):
“[T]o require no compliance at all would defeat the whole idea of planning. Why
have a plan if the local government units are free to ignore it at any time?”
57. See Mandelker, supra note 39, at 911.
58. Sullivan, supra note 41, at 178.
59. James A. Kushner, Smart Growth: Urban Growth Management and Land-Use
Regulation Law in America, 32 URB. LAW. 211, 229 (2000).
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60

scholar of planning maintains.
“Comprehensive planning is a
61
comprehensive response to the systemic problems of sprawl.”
Comprehensive plans have played a central role in Minnesota’s
62
response to sprawl.
The Twin Cities has long been one of
63
America’s least-dense metropolitan areas. Concerns about sprawl
began during the 1950s amid waves of migration from Minnesota
64
cities to the suburbs. The growth overwhelmed sewage treatment
systems, leading to widespread polluted wells and a public health
65
crisis. Into the 1960s, the Twin Cities region was suffering the
growth pains familiar across the country—leapfrogging, scattered
66
development, urban sprawl, and deteriorating central cities.
Sprawl not only threatened loss of open space but also meant more
costly public and private facilities and ultimately “vastly” higher
67
taxes. Eventually it would mean “wellwater problems in Olmsted
County, farmland [loss] in Winona, failing septic systems in Stearns
County, rising poverty in Minneapolis and St. Paul, [and]
68
exclusionary zoning in developing suburbs.”
Sprawl posed the
“[number one] threat to community livability in America today,” an
69
author observed in 1996.
In 1967, the Minnesota Legislature created the Metropolitan
Council to oversee “a comprehensive development guide” for the
70
Minneapolis-St. Paul region.
The agency’s creation reflected a
desire to guard vital open space, and indeed, the region’s quality of
60. Sullivan, supra note 41, at 179.
61. Id.
62.
Janice C. Griffith, Regional Governance Reconsidered, 21 J.L. & POL. 505, 532
(2005).
63. Millett, supra note 34. See also Dan Wascoe Jr., Road to Sprawl Was Paved
with Good Intentions, STAR TRIB. (Minneapolis), Jan. 22, 2000, at 1A.
64. Lynda McDonnell, The Invisible Crisis, ST. PAUL PIONEER PRESS (Minn.),
Nov. 18, 1996, at 1A.
65. Id.
66. ROBERT H. FREILICH, FROM SPRAWL TO SMART GROWTH 109 (American Bar
Association 1999). Freilich was the lead consultant for preparing the Metropolitan
Council’s development framework in 1973. Id. at 108–09.
67. Id. at 109.
68. Lynda McDonnell, Can We Live with the Limits?, ST. PAUL PIONEER PRESS
(Minn.), Nov. 23, 1996, at 1A.
69. Bill Salisbury, In Fight Against Urban Sprawl, Maryland Tries ‘Smart Growth,’
ST. PAUL PIONEER PRESS (Minn.), Feb. 24, 1999, at 1A (quoting Richard Moe,
former chief of staff to Vice President Walter Mondale and later president of the
National Trust for Historic Preservation).
70. James Poradek, Putting the Use Back in Metropolitan Land-Use Planning:
Private Enforcement of Urban Sprawl Control Laws, 81 MINN. L. REV. 1343, 1355–56
(1997).
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71

life, against urban sprawl.
Gov. Harold LeVander, making the
first appointments to the council, said the council was needed to
attack “more and more problems that will pay no heed to the
boundary lines which mark the end of one community in this
72
metropolitan area and the beginning of another.” The council
73
was widely heralded as a model solution to sprawl.
C. Regional Planning in the Twin Cities
In 1976, lawmakers empowered the Council to control urban
sprawl by enacting the Metropolitan Land Use Planning Act
74
(MLPA). The enactment followed several years of conflict and
75
uncertainty, but once in place, the MLPA was a strong
endorsement of regional planning, declaring that local
governmental units were interdependent and that their
urbanization put pressure on the others, increasing the spillover
76
effects of pollution, congestion, and water shortages. Suddenly,
more than 300 separate but overlapping governmental units over
an area of 3,000 square miles and seven counties would have their

71. See City of Lake Elmo v. Metro. Council, 685 N.W.2d 1, 4 (Minn. 2004); see
also “History of the Metropolitan Council,” e-mail and attached document from Steven
Dornfeld, Director of Public Affairs, Metropolitan Council, to Eric Linsk (Sept. 5,
2006) (on file with author) [hereinafter Met Council History].
72. “Metropolitan Council Milestones,” e-mail and attached document from
Steven Dornfeld, Director of Public Affairs, Metropolitan Council, to Eric Linsk
(Sept. 5, 2006) (on file with author) [hereinafter Milestones].
73. Land Use: The Rage for Reform, TIME, Oct. 1, 1973, available at http://www.
time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,942725,00.html [hereinafter Rage for
Reform].
Regional-planning authorities should be encouraged wherever possible.
These can treat whole watersheds or air basins and thus cope with
environmental questions too large for local governments. They also are
needed around cities, where growth is often the concern of several
counties.
One model: the Twin Cities Metropolitan Council in
Minnesota, which plans development for nine counties and has veto
power over growth-inducing facilities—including projects like airports
and sewers.
Id.
74. See MINN. STAT. § 473.851 (2004) (declaring that urbanization and
development transcended municipal boundaries and required “comprehensive
local planning with land use controls consistent with planned, orderly and staged
development”); see also Poradek, supra note 70, at 1357.
75. ARTHUR NAFTALIN & JOHN BRANDL, THE TWIN CITIES REGIONAL STRATEGY 10
(Metropolitan Council of the Twin Cities Area 1980).
76. See MINN. STAT. § 473.851; City of Lake Elmo, 685 N.W.2d at 5.
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77

plans coordinated.
The governing bodies had to adopt
comprehensive plans consistent with the Metropolitan Council’s
Regional Development Framework and system plans for
transportation, aviation, water resources (including wastewater
78
collection and treatment), and regional parks and open space.
The Council was given authority to ensure that the plans conform
79
with regional goals.
Opinions are mixed as to whether the
council has been a success or a disappointment. The council has
80
received national acclaim, but critics charge that its promise
81
remains unfulfilled.
The council won a major victory in 2004
when the Minnesota Supreme Court ruled that the council could
82
order Lake Elmo to change its comprehensive plan.
The Twin Cities regional structure requires municipalities to
83
enact zoning controls to implement the comprehensive plan. But
that goal has been undermined by the uneasy relationship between
comprehensive plans and zoning ordinances, where it has not
always been clear whether the comprehensive plan is binding and
which document prevails in a conflict. The Minnesota legislature
has see-sawed back and forth as to whether comprehensive plans or
84
zoning ordinances should be preeminent.
First, lawmakers
85
favored comprehensive plans.
In 1985, they made zoning

77. FREILICH, supra note 66, at 109–10.
78. Milestones, supra note 72.
79. See MINN. STAT. § 473.175, subdiv. 1 (2004); City of Lake Elmo, 685 N.W.2d
at 5; Griffith, supra note 62, at 532; NAFTALIN & BRANDL, supra note 75, at 8–10; Met
Council History, supra note 71.
80. TIME, Rage for Reform, supra note 73; Poradek, supra note 70, at 1345.
81. See Poradek, supra note 70, at 1344 (arguing that suburban cities’
resistance to provide affordable housing has been “more than embarrassing”);
NAFTALIN & BRANDL, supra note 75, at 59 (finding a consensus in 1980 that the
council had become less aggressive, less innovative, and more bureaucratic);
MYRON ORFIELD, METROPOLITICS 102 (1997) (contending that the council, with its
weak derivative power, “has avoided confrontation”); Mike Kaszuba, A ‘Delicate
Balance’ for Met Council Members, STAR TRIB. (Minneapolis), June 30, 1996, at 1A
(remarking that the council “has in many eyes grown into an ineffective
bureaucracy”).
82. City of Lake Elmo, 685 N.W.2d at 11–12.
83. MINN. STAT. § 473.858, subdiv. 1 (2004).
84. See Mendota Golf, LLP v. City of Mendota Heights, 708 N.W.2d 162, 166–
67 (Minn. 2006); Poradek, supra note 70, at 1356–58.
85. Poradek, supra note 70, at 1357. Requiring local zoning controls to
conform to comprehensive plans reflected the planning act’s original intent, “that
local governments use zoning to carry out the policies of their comprehensive
plans.” Id.
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86

ordinances predominant.
With that change, “the whole
comprehensive planning process in the Twin Cities became null
and void,” recalled Ted Mondale, a state senator from 1990 to 1996
87
and chairman of the Metropolitan Council from 1999 to 2003. In
August 1995, at Mondale’s behest, the legislature enacted changes
to the MLPA that had been requested by the Metropolitan Council,
including a provision restoring the primacy of comprehensive
88
plans. One senator who spoke against the bill argued that it took
89
away local zoning control. But the adherents of regional planning
90
had regained the upper hand. A later attempt by some legislators
91
to change the law back again failed.

86. Mendota Golf, 708 N.W.2d at 166; Act of May 6, 1985, ch. 62, sec. 4, subdiv.
1, 1985 Minn. Laws 162 (stating that “[i]f the comprehensive municipal plan is in
conflict with the zoning ordinance, the zoning ordinance supersedes the plan”
(formerly codified as amended at MINN. STAT. § 473.858, subdiv. 1)). The
measure apparently was introduced to help a suburban community fend off a
development proposal. See Cindy Carlsson, How Bad Ideas Become Law, Minnesota
Chapter of the American Planning Association (June 1997), available at
http://www.mnapa.com/previousnews/june97.html.
87. Telephone interview with Ted Mondale, CEO, Nazca Solutions, Inc. in St.
Paul, Minn. (Sept. 20, 2006).
88. See Act of May 17, 1995, ch. 176, sec. 5, 1995 Minn. Laws 593, 594–95
(codified as amended at MINN. STAT. § 473.858, subdiv. 1 (2005), striking out
language saying the zoning ordinance “supersedes” the comprehensive plan);
BRIEFLY: THE MINNESOTA SENATE WEEK IN REVIEW (May 12, 1995), available at
http://www.senate.mn/briefly/1995/bri512.txt [hereinafter SENATE BRIEFLY]
(reporting legislative debate comments by Sen. Ted Mondale about his proposed
amendment to § 473.858); Brief of Appellant at 29–30, Mendota Golf, LLP v. City
of Mendota Heights 708 N.W.2d 162 (Minn. 2006) (No. A04-206) (quoting Sen.
Mondale saying in floor debate that “the comprehensive plan has to be more
important than the zoning documents”).
89. SENATE BRIEFLY, supra note 88 (reporting comments of Sen. Roy
Terwilliger, R–Edina).
90. The planning statute now reads:
If the comprehensive municipal plan is in conflict with the zoning
ordinance, the zoning ordinance shall be brought into conformance with
the plan by local government units in conjunction with the review and, if
necessary, amendment of its comprehensive plan. . . . After August 1,
1995, a local government unit shall not adopt any fiscal device or official
control which is in conflict with its comprehensive plan . . . .
MINN. STAT. § 473.858, subdiv. 1 (2004).
91. Carlsson, supra note 86. Rep. Tim Pawlenty, later to become Minnesota’s
governor, was a co-sponsor of the bill. Journal of the House of Representatives,
80th Leg., Reg. Sess., 3974 (Minn. May 12, 1997). The bill died in committee.
H.F. 2205 Status in House for Legislative Session 80, at http://ros.leg.mn/re
visor/pages/search_status/status_detail.php?b=House&f=HF2205&ssn=0&y=1997
(last visited Jan. 9, 2007).
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III. THE MENDOTA GOLF DECISION
A. Facts and Procedural History
The 17.5-acre property at Dodd Road and Bachelor Avenue in
suburban Mendota Heights has been a nine-hole, par-three golf
92
course since the early 1960s. One city council member called the
93
tract “a treasure to the neighborhood.” Neighbors considered the
course and other green spaces part of what made Mendota Heights
94
different from other suburbs.
Homeowners on the course’s
95
southern side enjoyed a scenic view of the Mississippi River. “Par
3,” as people called it, was also the only remaining public golf
96
course in Mendota Heights.
97
Mendota Golf, LLP, purchased the property in January 1995.
At the time of its acquisition, the land was zoned Residential (R-1
One-Family Residential), while the city’s comprehensive plan
98
labeled the property as “Golf Course” (GC). Mendota Golf paid
99
$1.289 million for the property, which was an “inflated price” for a
100
golf course.
Because of the zoning designation, the owners
believed they had a “safety net” to develop the property someday if
101
That day came in 2003,
the golf course became unprofitable.
when the landowners sold to a developer that proposed to do away
102
with the golf course and build homes on the property.
But the
92. Mendota Golf, 708 N.W.2d at 166.
93. Mendota Heights City Council Minutes 9 (July 1, 2003), available at
http://www.mendota-heights.com/pdf/03july1.pdf [hereinafter July 2003 Minutes]
(reporting the remarks of Councilmember Mary Jeanne Schneeman).
94. Id. at 15 (reporting the statement of Dr. Jim Smith, a neighbor of the
property).
95. Peterson, supra note 10, at 3B (quoting lawyer for Mendota Heights).
Others, including attorney Clifford M. Greene, argued that “[p]eople who have
bought land based on those views are entitled to some rights as well.” Id.
96. Mendota Heights Parks and Recreation Committee Minutes 2 (Oct. 12,
2004) (reporting comments of Commissioner Morris)[hereinafter Parks and Rec
Minutes].
97. Mendota Golf, 708 N.W.2d at 166.
98. Id.
99. July 2003 Minutes, supra note 93, at 9 (reporting the statement of Mendota
Golf partner Alan Spaulding).
100. Id. at 12.
101. See Mendota Golf, 708 N.W.2d at 166. At the time of the purchase,
Minnesota law made zoning designations preeminent over comprehensive plan
designations. Id. About five months after the purchase, the legislature restored
comprehensive plans’ prominence. Id.
102. Id. at 169.
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land sale was contingent on persuading Mendota Heights to
change the comprehensive plan’s designation of the property from
103
golf course to low-density residential.
In the years leading up to Mendota Golf’s request, the city had
104
gone through an extensive review of its land-use goals. Mendota
Heights officials in 2002 reaffirmed planning goals they had first
enacted in 1979 in accordance with the Metropolitan Land
105
Planning Act. Back in 1979, the comprehensive plan put the golf
course property in the land use category “GC” for golf course, and
106
“guided” the adjacent land as low-density residential.
The GC
107
The 1979 plan’s goals—
designation was retained in 2002.
including preservation of green spaces, open spaces, and
108
recreational facilities—were also renewed in 2002. The adoption
of the comprehensive plan in 2002 followed a three-year review
109
process in which several public hearings were held.
Mendota
Golf did not come before the city at that time to request changes in
110
the property’s designation. A partner in Mendota Golf later said
111
he and his partner were not aware of the hearings.
But the city’s policy choice was still tinged with ambiguity.
While officials maintained the golf course designation in the
comprehensive plan, they failed to resolve the apparent conflict
between the plan and the zoning ordinance, keeping the property’s
112
The city’s officials also left open the
residential zoning in place.
113
possibility that the golf course might someday be developed.
Against this uncertain backdrop, Mendota Golf in 2003
requested that the city change the comprehensive plan’s
designation for the property from “Golf Course” to “Low Density
103. Id. Specifically, the sale was contingent on "the buyer's obtaining
necessary governmental approvals for proposed residential development." Id.
104. Id. at 167–68.
105. Id. at 167.
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. Id. at 168.
111. Id. at 170.
112. Id. at 168. The city’s Technical Plan, though, expressed “concern” about
the conflict, given the city’s obligations under the MLPA, and legal uncertainty
over how to move forward. Id. at 168 n.4.
113. Id. at 168. The city’s Technical Plan stated that if “future redevelopment
of this site is contemplated, careful consideration would need to be given to
develop the site in a manner consistent with and sensitive to the existing lowdensity residential neighborhood.” Id. (citation omitted in original).
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114

Residential.” A Mendota Golf partner said the golf course was no
115
The city’s consulting planner recommended
longer profitable.
that “an alternate land use designation for the site is appropriate,”
depending on review of the landowner’s claim that a golf course
116
was no longer viable. But sentiment for its preservation remained
strong and after a public hearing, the city planning commission
117
recommended rejecting the request.
The city council then
118
turned it down by a 5–0 vote after a tense public meeting.
Officials and residents began floating the idea that the city
119
purchase the property to keep it a golf course.
120
Mendota Golf brought an action for mandamus in district
court asking that the city be ordered to change the comprehensive
121
plan as requested.
The district court granted the order, finding
the city’s denial had been arbitrary, capricious, and without a
122
123
rational basis.
The court of appeals affirmed.
The court of
appeals emphasized the city’s failure for nearly eight years to carry
124
The court of
out its statutory duty to reconcile the two plans.
114. Id. at 169.
115. Id. In 2003, Alan Spaulding said Mendota Golf lost money on the golf
course in every year since it was acquired. Brian Bonner, Key Ruling Undercuts Golf
Course Backers, ST. PAUL PIONEER PRESS (Minn.), Dec. 12, 2003, at B2 [hereinafter
Bonner, Key Ruling]. Spaulding asked the city to “restore the rights” that the
landowners first had when they purchased the property, back when the zoning
ordinance prevailed over the comprehensive plan and allowed residential
development on the parcel. 708 N.W.2d at 169 (citation omitted in original). But
see Brian Bonner, Par 3 Opponent Raises His Voice, ST. PAUL PIONEER PRESS (Minn.),
Feb. 8, 2007 (discussing newly released financial statements showing “what city
officials have contended all along: [that] [m]inus debt service for the purchase,
the course is profitable”).
116. 708 N.W.2d at 169 (citation omitted in original).
117. See id.
118. See id. at 169–70. Mendota Golf partner Alan Spaulding told the council
that his firm had a contract to sell to a development company for more than
double the price that a golfing group had offered. See July 2003 Minutes, supra
note 93, at 8. The conditional offer was for $2.35 million. Bonner, Key Ruling,
supra note 115. Council Member Jack Vitelli responded that the Council had no
obligation to help the landowners double their money over the original purchase
price. July 2003 Minutes, supra note 93, at 10.
119. Parks and Rec Minutes, supra note 96, at 2–3.
120. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 980 (8th ed. 2004) (defining mandamus as “[a]
writ issued by a superior court to compel a lower court or governmental officer to
perform mandatory or purely ministerial duties correctly”).
121. Mendota Golf, 708 N.W.2d at 170.
122. Id.
123. Mendota Golf, LLP v. City of Mendota Heights, No. A04-206, 2004 WL
2161422, at *1 (Minn. Ct. App. 2004), rev’d, 708 N.W.2d 162 (Minn. 2006).
124. Mendota Golf, 2004 WL 2161422, at *2.
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appeals also seized on a “peculiar provision” in Mendota Heights’
comprehensive plan “stating that the primary authority for
125
development decisions is the zoning ordinance.”
The court of
appeals interpreted the statement to mean that in a conflict
between the comprehensive plan and the zoning ordinance, the
126
zoning ordinance shall prevail.
B. The Minnesota Supreme Court’s Decision
The Minnesota Supreme Court reversed the court of
127
The court found that the zoning and comprehensive
appeals.
128
129
plan conflicted, and that under state law the landowner was
indeed entitled to a writ of mandamus directing the city to resolve
130
the conflict. But the supreme court found that the district court
exceeded its authority by ordering the city to resolve the conflict in
131
a specific way.
132
The court found that the Minnesota Land Planning Act was
133
clear about the dominance of comprehensive municipal plans
134
Therefore, the
and their place in a regional planning scheme.
135
mandamus order would force the city to violate the statute.
The court noted that previous case law considered a legislative
body’s enactment of zoning regulations an act of legislative
136
discretion.
Courts upheld zoning decisions unless challengers
could show the classification lacked any relationship to public
health, safety, morals, or general welfare—the “rational basis”
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. Mendota Golf, 708 N.W.2d at 182.
128. Id. at 173.
129. MINN. STAT. § 473.858, subdiv. 1 (2004).
130. Mendota Golf, 708 N.W.2d at 183.
131. Id. at 174 (emphasis added).
132. MINN. STAT. § 473.858, subdiv. 1 (2004).
133. “When the words of a statute . . . are clear and free from ambiguity,
judicial construction is inappropriate.” Chanhassen Estates Residents Ass’n v. City
of Chanhassen, 342 N.W.2d 335, 339 (Minn. 1984).
134. See Mendota Golf, 708 N.W.2d at 175.
135. Id. As a threshold issue, the supreme court discussed whether mandamus
was appropriate to compel Mendota Heights to amend its comprehensive plan. Id.
at 171–79. The court concluded mandamus was not appropriate because it would
have invaded the city’s exercise of legislative discretion in zoning matters, but the
court went on to consider the substantive issues anyway. Id. at 179.
136. Mendota Golf, 708 N.W.2d at 174 (citing Honn v. City of Coon Rapids, 313
N.W.2d 409, 414 (Minn. 1981)).
See also State, by Rochester Ass’n of
Neighborhoods v. City of Rochester, 268 N.W.2d 885, 888 (Minn. 1978).
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test.
In this case, Mendota Heights acted rationally based on
139
the property’s historical designation, regulation, and character,
140
and in light of the city’s extensive planning process.
The dissent, for its part, expressed concern about the
141
The ruling
decision’s impact on private-property rights.
effectively ordered the landowner to forever keep the property as a
142
golf course due to its value to the community as open space.
Indeed, the dissent asserted that “there might be regulatory taking
143
implications in the actions taken by the City.” Mendota Golf had
144
not argued a takings claim, despite one of its partners earlier
145
The majority said the
hinting at it before the city council.
landowners, after remand, could return with a regulatory takings
146
claim if unable to reach a settlement with the city.
IV. ANALYSIS OF MENDOTA GOLF
Mendota Golf is the latest case to seriously test Minnesota’s
commitment to the system of regional planning laid out by the
137. Mendota Golf, 708 N.W.2d at 179–80 (quoting Honn, 313 N.W.2d at 414–
15).
138. Id. at 182. “[W]e conclude that legitimate objectives supported the city's
denial of Mendota Golf's application for an amendment to the city's
comprehensive plan, and Mendota Golf has failed to establish that the city lacked
a rational basis for the decision.” Id. The court of appeals had not even applied
the rationality test. Mendota Golf, LLP v. City of Mendota Heights, No. A04-206,
2004 WL 2161422, at *3 (Minn. Ct. App. Sept. 28, 2004), rev’d, 708 N.W.2d 162.
The appellate court said the city lacked entitlement to rational basis review
because it had not put all its stated reasons for rejection into its resolution. See id.
139. Mendota Golf, 708 N.W.2d at 181 n.13.
140. Id. at 181. Nevertheless, the supreme court decided the “peculiar phrase”
did not confer primary power on the zoning ordinance, because of additional
language in the provision, which said that the comprehensive plan provides the
city’s land-use goals, “while the zoning ordinance provides the legislative means of
carrying out those goals.” Mendota Golf, 708 N.W.2d at 175 n.8.
141. Mendota Golf, 708 N.W.2d at 162, 184 (Anderson, J., dissenting).
142. Id. The dissent also said it was “not at all clear” that the city had acted
rationally. Id.
143. Id. (citing McShane v. City of Faribault, 292 N.W.2d 253 (Minn. 1980)
(holding that landowners deprived of economic benefit by zoning regulations
were entitled to compensation under some circumstances)).
144. Id.
145. July 2003 Minutes, supra note 93, at 8–9.
146. Mendota Golf, 708 N.W.2d at 182. The city is now moving toward bringing
its plans into conformance. E-mail from John Huber, Mayor of Mendota Heights,
to Eric Linsk (Oct. 2, 2006, 07:59 CDT) (on file with author). The city has verbally
told the landowners that Mendota Heights would comply with the court’s
direction by Dec. 31, 2006. Id.
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legislature—albeit in fits and starts—over the last thirty years. The
Court refrained from making bold pronouncements about that
planning scheme, instead hewing closely to the legislative authority
and producing a careful, functional decision.
A. Legislature Embraces Regionalism, For Now
Since the inception of the regional planning statute,
lawmakers in Minnesota have demonstrated ambivalence about
147
how much power to invest in the comprehensive plan.
Nonetheless, the statute has remained constant now for more than
148
a decade, suggesting that the legislature has settled the issue.
1.

Legislative Intent

Records of the 1995 debate indicate that legislators intended
149
The sponsor of
to restore the primacy of comprehensive plans.
150
But the change was not
the change was open about its purpose.
without opponents. One senator criticized the 1995 measure and
151
tried in vain to delete the pertinent provisions.
A bill proposed
152
Comprehensive
in 1997 to reverse course again went nowhere.
153
plans are a key facet of the Met Council’s regional strategy, a
154
strategy that was reaffirmed in the Lake Elmo decision. As a policy
matter, it is reasonable to read the Metropolitan Land Planning
155
Act as requiring that zoning conform to comprehensive plans.
2.
that

Statutory Construction

The city argued and the Minnesota Supreme Court accepted
zoning ordinances must be brought in line with

147. Compare MINN. STAT. § 473.858, subdiv. 1 (1994) (providing that a city’s
zoning designations take priority over conflicting comprehensive plans), with
MINN. STAT. § 473.858, subdiv. 1 (2004) (providing that comprehensive plans take
priority).
148. MINN. STAT. § 473.858, subdiv. 1 (2004); Mendota Golf, 708 N.W.2d at 166.
149. Brief of Appellant City of Mendota Heights at 29–30, Mendota Golf, 708
N.W.2d 162 (Minn. 2006) (No. A04-0206) (quoting Sen. Ted Mondale, sponsor of
the amendment favoring comprehensive plans).
150. Brief of Appellant City of Mendota Heights, supra note 149, at 29–30.
151. SENATE BRIEFLY, supra note 88 (reporting debate comments of Sen. Roy
Terwilliger).
152. H.R. 2205, 80th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Minn. 1997).
153. Mendota Golf, 708 N.W.2d at 182.
154. City of Lake Elmo v. Metro. Council, 685 N.W.2d 1, 11 (Minn. 2004).
155. MINN. STAT. § 473.858, subdiv. 1 (2004).
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156

comprehensive plans.
But as the landowners argued, the statute
does allow for conflicts to be resolved by amendment of the
157
comprehensive plan.
Though this is a reasonable reading, the
158
text does not require a city to choose that route, and for the court
to order such an action would undermine the legislature’s choice
159
to invest authority in the comprehensive plan.
In the end, by upholding Mendota Heights’ refusal to change
its comprehensive plan, the Minnesota Supreme Court respected
the legislature’s clear policy choice in 1995 elevating the
comprehensive plan in order to control and guide growth.
B. Municipal Planning and Zoning Power
Mendota Golf posed the question: who gets to decide what a city
160
The
looks like—its citizen-residents or its property owners?
Minnesota Supreme Court answered that the city had the right to
161
stand by its vision, sand traps and all.
The case’s outcome arguably caused an injustice to the
Mendota Golf partners, who purchased land only to see the
162
regulatory ground shift under their feet six months later. But as
the court said, “the power to zone has been delegated to the city
163
council and not to the courts.”
The supreme court has
consistently recognized in the past that municipalities making
zoning decisions are acting in their legislative capacities under
164
their delegated police powers. Those decisions are upheld unless
156. Mendota Golf, 708 N.W.2d at 175; Brief of Appellant City of Mendota
Heights, supra note 149, at 35.
157. MINN. STAT. § 473.858, subdiv. 1 (2004); Brief of Respondent Mendota
Golf, LLP at 12, Mendota Golf, 708 N.W.2d 162 (Minn. 2006) (No. A04-0206).
158. Mendota Golf, 708 N.W.2d at 175.
159. Id.
160. See id. at 175.
161. Id. at 183 (stating that the City Council is permitted to exercise its
discretion in resolving the conflict between the comprehensive plan and the
zoning ordinance).
162. Several events combined to shift the regulatory ground on which
Mendota Golf partners stood. The landowners purchased the property in 1995 in
reliance on the law at that time. See id. at 169. The city failed to reconcile its
comprehensive plan and zoning ordinance for eight years despite state law
requiring it. Id. at 182. The city wrote the “peculiar provision” in the
comprehensive plan, which appeared to delegate power back to the zoning
ordinance. Id. at 175 n.8. The golf course was entirely surrounded by singlefamily residential development. Id. at 166.
163. Id., 708 N.W.2d at 182.
164. State, by Rochester Ass’n of Neighborhoods v. City of Rochester, 268
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opponents prove the decisions lack any rational basis related to
165
public health, safety, morals, or the general welfare. In Mendota
Heights’ case, the city decided after an extensive planning process,
that keeping the property a “Par 3” golf course was related to
166
public health and the general welfare.
The city likewise was
making a rational legislative decision when it considered the
property owners’ proposed change in the comprehensive plan and
167
turned it down.
C. The Unresolved Question of Regulatory Taking
A looming question is whether the landowners were subjected
168
to a “regulatory taking.” The landowners did not bring a takings
claim, so the supreme court majority did not analyze the
169
question.
A traditional physical taking occurs when the
government seizes property through its powers of eminent
170
A regulatory taking occurs when government regulates
domain.
property so substantially that the property has arguably been
171
“taken” by the government.
Distinguishing a regulatory taking from a permissible planning
regulation (which does not require compensation) can be
172
difficult.
The U.S. Supreme Court’s takings jurisprudence has
zigged and zagged over the past eighty years and left hazy and
173
shifting guidance.
In 1922, in the Court’s first major modern
N.W.2d 885, 888 (Minn. 1978).
165. Id.
166. Mendota Golf, 708 N.W.2d at 167, 169.
167. Id. at 169–70.
168. U.S. CONST., amend. V; Callies, supra note 3; see also Arthur G. Boylan,
Note, Property—Losing Clarity in Loss of Access Cases: The Minnesota Supreme Court’s
Muddled Analysis in Dale Properties, LLC v. State, 29 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 695, 706
(2002) (observing that Minnesota largely follows the U.S. Supreme Court’s takings
jurisprudence and likewise “lacks clarity”).
169. Mendota Golf, 708 N.W.2d at 182 n.14. The court did not address
“whether Mendota Golf might ultimately have a valid takings claim based on the
proposition that the restrictions on the use of its land to a golf course constitutes a
regulatory taking.” Id.
170. Joseph William Singer, The Ownership Society and Takings of Property: Castles,
Investments, and Just Obligations, 30 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 309, 314 (2006).
171. Id.
172. See McShane v. City of Faribault, 292 N.W.2d 253, 257 (Minn. 1980)
(remarking on the “great deal of confusion over the standards used to determine
whether there has been a taking of private property as a result of governmental
regulation of land use”).
173. The Supreme Court has twice quoted planning scholar Charles Haar in
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takings case, it found a state effort to regulate subsistence coal
174
Four decades later, the
mining so onerous as to be a taking.
Court declared that “[t]here is no set formula to determine where
175
regulation ends and taking begins.” It is essentially a question of
176
In more recent decades, a nascent property
“reasonableness.”
rights movement has reignited the Court’s search for discernible
177
takings standards. Mendota Heights’ decision meets the modern
tests established by the U.S. Supreme Court and followed by
178
Minnesota.
1.

Penn Central

In 1978, the Supreme Court in Penn Central Transportation Co.
v. New York City decided the city had not committed a regulatory
taking when it refused a developer’s plan to build a fifty-story office
179
building atop the stately Grand Central Station. The decision
180
Where there is neither a
established a new approach to takings.
physical invasion nor a total loss of economic value, the court said,

regulatory cases, remarking that “the attempt to distinguish ‘regulation’ from
‘taking’ as the most haunting jurisprudential problem in the field of
contemporary land-use law . . . one that may be the lawyer's equivalent of the
physicist's hunt for the quark.” See Williamson County Reg’l Planning Comm’n v.
Hamilton Bank, 473 U.S. 172, 200 n.17 (1985) (quoting CHARLES M. HAAR, LAND
USE PLANNING 766 (3d ed. 1976)); San Diego Gas & Elec. v. City of San Diego, 450
U.S. 621, 650 n.15 (1981) (Brennen, J., dissenting) (quoting CHARLES M. HAAR,
LAND USE PLANNING (3d ed. 1976)).
174. In Penn. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922), the Court held that a
“diminution in value” from a government regulation would constitute a taking. Id.
at 415. The case is remembered for Justice Holmes’ pronouncement that “while
property may be regulated to a certain extent, if regulation goes too far it will be
recognized as a taking.” Id.
175. Goldblatt v. Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590, 594 (1962).
176. Id. at 594–95.
177. See, e.g., Hawaii Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229, 241 (holding a
taking should be upheld as consistent with the Public Use Clause, U.S. Const.,
amend. 5, as long as it is “rationally related to a conceivable public purpose”); Kelo
v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469 (holding that city’s exercise of economic
development plan satisfied constitutional “public use” requirement).
178. Boylan, supra note 168, at 706.
179. 438 U.S. 104, 138 (1978).
180. Prior to Penn Central, the most influential takings case had been
Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922), which held that government
regulation becomes a compensable taking when it causes a diminution in value of
“a certain magnitude.” 260 U.S. at 413. Penn Central, to the contrary, held that
mere diminution in value from land use regulations did not, standing alone,
constitute a taking. 438 U.S. at 130–31.

http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol33/iss2/5

20

Linsk: Property-hole-in-one for Land-use Control: Endorsing the Dominanc
6. LINSK - RC.DOC

2007]

3/7/2007 12:55:53 PM

HOLE-IN-ONE FOR LAND-USE CONTROL

647

181

a balancing test is applied.
Factors to be balanced include the
extent of the economic impact on the property owner, the owner’s
distinct investment-backed expectations, and the law’s benefit to
182
the public.
Based on the application of these factors, the
comprehensive plan in Mendota Golf would likely survive the Penn
Central balancing test.
a.

Public Purpose Justified City’s Action

Penn Central observed that a taking is less likely to be found
when interference with property arises from a “public program
adjusting the benefits and burdens of economic life to promote the
183
The Mendota Heights City Council stated a
common good.”
public purpose—maintenance of green space and recreational
options for the residents—in retaining the comprehensive plan’s
184
golf course designation.
The city conducted a democratic
185
process with notice and hearings and maintained a designation
186
The landowner,
that had been on the books since 1979.
187
however, failed to show up during the review of the plan.
b.

Owner’s Expectations

Applying the Penn Central framework, a crucial point is
whether the partners’ investment-backed expectations in 1995—
which amounted to the belief that development could be a “safety
188
net” if the golf course did not work out —were distinct.
Evaluating the “distinct” question in hindsight is difficult, and the
case brought out little hard evidence on the point. An owner’s
189
expectations are based on the facts at the time of purchase.
181. Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 124.
182. Id.
183. Id.
184. See Mendota Golf, LLP v. City of Mendota Heights, 708 N.W.2d 162, 167
(Minn. 2006).
185. Id. at 168.
186. Id. at 167.
187. See id. at 168. “Despite published notice of the city's plans to revise its
comprehensive plan, Mendota Golf did not appear before the city to request
alternate ‘guiding’ of the property.” Id.
188. See July 2003 Minutes, supra note 93, at 12 (stating that the owner claimed
to have paid an inflated market price—about double—for the golf course with the
expectation that should the business fail, development of the property was a viable
alternative).
189. See, e.g., Wensmann Realty, Inc. v. City of Eagan, No. A05-1074, 2006 WL
1390278, *3 (Minn. Ct. App. May 23, 2006), rev. granted (Aug. 15, 2006) (citing
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Mendota Golf bought the property as a golf course and operated it
190
as a golf course for eight years. Had the landowner’s plans been
distinct, the firm would have sought an amendment to the
comprehensive plan right away to resolve the conflict between the
plan and the zoning ordinance, rather than waiting eight years. It
would have paid attention to—and perhaps intervened to
prevent—the important change in land-use law enacted by the
legislature, which flip-flopped the authority of comprehensive plans
191
and zoning ordinances.
It would have come forward when
Mendota Heights reviewed the comprehensive plan and reenacted
192
Through the lens of
the golf course designation in 2002.
hindsight, it looks as much like a bad business decision as an
193
investment.
A recent decision of the Minnesota Court of Appeals,
194
influenced by the Mendota Golf ruling, employed a similar analysis
in rejecting a takings claim involving another golf course in the
195
In both cases, it was not the cities’ actions that
Twin Cities.
caused the golf courses’ economic troubles.
2.

Lucas

Fourteen years after Penn Central, the Supreme Court tackled
another regulatory takings case, Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal
196
Council.
David Lucas purchased beachfront lots on a barrier
island east of Charleston with the intention of building single197
family homes.
A regulatory change in South Carolina’s coastal-

Zeman v. City of Minneapolis, 552 N.W.2d 548, 553 (Minn. 1996)). In Wensmann,
the court noted that a buyer of a golf course “had no reasonable investmentbacked expectation to develop its land as residential property because [the buyer]
purchased the land as an established golf course with the intention of continuing
to operate it as a golf course . . . [t]he applicant for rezoning ‘knew at the time of
purchase that the property was subject to a zoning restriction.’” Id. at *3 (citing
Myron v. City of Plymouth, 562 N.W.2d 21, 23–24 (Minn. Ct. App. 1997), aff'd
without opinion, 581 N.W.2d 815 (Minn. 1998)).
190. See Mendota Golf, 708 N.W.2d at 169.
191. Id. at 166.
192. Id. at 167.
193. See July 2003 Minutes, supra note 93, at 8 (stating that after eight years of
operation, the golf course was not profitable and that the owner just wanted to be
rid of the property and to recoup some or all of his investment).
194. Wensmann Realty, 2006 WL 1390278.
195. Id. at *2–4.
196. 505 U.S. 1003 (1992).
197. Id. at 1006–07.
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zone permit requirements foiled his plans, and he was prohibited
198
The Supreme Court was asked to
from building on the lots.
decide whether the regulation’s dramatic effect on the economic
199
value of the lots amounted to a regulatory taking.
The majority opinion in Lucas attempted to establish a more
200
objective standard for regulatory takings than Penn Central had.
The Lucas Court declared that a total wipeout of a property’s value
is a per se taking unless the government regulation is addressing a
201
traditional common-law nuisance.
The Mendota Golf facts are far different from those in Lucas. In
202
Lucas, the property owner was stuck with unimprovable lots.
Under the Mendota Heights comprehensive plan, by contrast, the
developers’ property still had value as a golf course, albeit perhaps
203
an unprofitable one.
One person had expressed interest in
buying the property, but the price was not high enough for the
204
Mendota Golf partners.
3.

Lingle

The Supreme Court’s latest word on takings came in Lingle v.
205
Chevron U.S.A., Inc. There are two circumstances that will be held
206
as per se takings: physical occupations
and total economic

198. Id. at 1007.
199. Id.
200. Kushner, supra note 59, at 216.
201. 505 U.S. at 1019, 1030–32. Debate has raged ever since over the impact
of Lucas. See RUTHERFORD H. PLATT, LAND USE & SOCIETY 267 (1996). Professor
James Kushner has called Lucas a “powerful precedent” that validates virtually all
mainstream zoning and land development regulation, and most growth
management strategies as well. Kushner, supra note 59, at 218. Kushner argues
that, despite the rise of the property rights movement, courts are more deferential
than ever to local planning autonomy, including smart growth strategies. Id. at
237.
202. 505 U.S. at 1009. Some observers continue to dispute the underlying
facts of Lucas. See Singer, supra note 170, at 317.
203. July 2003 Minutes, supra note 93, at 9.
204. Id. at 8 (reporting remarks of partner Alan Spaulding that the offered
price “was no where [sic] near where it had to be”).
205. 544 U.S. 528 (2005). In Lingle, responding to concerns about the effects
of market concentration on gasoline prices, the State of Hawaii had limited the
rent that oil companies could charge service station operators. Id. at 533.
Chevron persuaded the federal district court that the cap was an uncompensated
taking because it did not “substantially advance” Hawaii's asserted interest in
controlling gas prices. Id. at 533–34.
206. Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419 (1982).
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207

wipeout.
Otherwise, takings claims are judged by the balancing
208
factors of Penn Central, with the inquiry reduced to whether the
impact of the regulatory action was “functionally equivalent” to a
classic taking in which government took property from a private
209
owner or ousted the owner.
In the Mendota Golf case, the city’s
action was not equivalent to a physical taking or ouster, rather it
involved the city’s classic use of traditional land-use regulation in
210
the public interest.
4.

McShane

The Mendota Golf dissent, in raising the possibility that
Mendota Heights had engaged in a regulatory taking, observed that
Minnesota entitles property owners deprived of economic benefit
by zoning regulations to compensation “under some
211
circumstances.”
But the cited case’s application to the Mendota
Golf facts is questionable. McShane v. City of Faribault involved a
municipal airport zoning regulation that affected nearby private
212
property. In McShane, the Minnesota Supreme Court held that if
the land-use regulation is enacted for the benefit of a “government
enterprise,” the government must compensate the affected
213
landowners.
Mendota Heights, in contrast, was not burdening a
214
Moreover,
property owner to benefit a government enterprise.
McShane held that if an ordinance has a “legitimate comprehensive
planning objective, there is no taking unless all reasonable uses of

207. Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1003.
208. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978).
209. Lingle, 544 U.S. at 538–39 (quoting Penn Cent. Transp., 438 U.S. at 124).
See also Daphne Vlcek, Consumers Union Of United States, Inc. v. New York, 22 TOURO
L. REV. 319, 331 (2006).
210. Mendota Golf, LLP v. City of Mendota Heights, 708 N.W.2d 162, 181–82
(Minn. 2006).
211. Id. at 184 (citing McShane v. City of Faribault, 292 N.W.2d 253 (1980)).
212. 292 N.W.2d at 255–56.
213. Id. at 258–59. McShane embraced Professor Joseph Sax’s argument that a
regulatory taking occurs when government acts as entrepreneur, but not where
the government acts in its traditional role as arbiter. See Joseph L. Sax, Takings and
the Police Power, 74 YALE L.J. 36 (1964). In McShane, the City of Faribault was acting
as an entrepreneur by operating an airport. 292 N.W.2d at 258–59.
214. But see Mendota Heights City Council Minutes 24 (May 6, 2003), available
at http://www.mendota-heights.com/pdf/03May06.pdf (reporting statement of
developer’s representative Jim Johnston that property owners should not be asked
to provide the public with open space in perpetuity).
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215

the property have been proscribed.”
The Mendota Heights
comprehensive plan had the legitimate objective of keeping the
parcel a golf course, and continued use as a golf course was
216
reasonable.
Lastly, McShane required compensation to
landowners whose property has suffered a “substantial and
measurable decline in market value as a result of the
217
regulations.” Mendota Golf’s property, under the comprehensive
plan designation in place since 1979, maintains the same value it
has had all along—the value of a golf course.
D. Impact: Regional Planning v. Property Rights
218

The majority in Mendota Golf said its decision was narrow.
219
In fact,
But some outside observers predicted a broad impact.
the ruling’s influence was demonstrated almost immediately, as
officials in neighboring Eagan were encouraged by the Mendota Golf
ruling to resist development plans on the Carriage Hills golf
220
course.
The gamble succeeded, as the Minnesota Court of
Appeals reversed a district court’s order that Eagan amend its
221
The court of
comprehensive plan to allow the development.
222
appeals relied squarely on Mendota Golf.
“The ‘legitimate
interests’ recognized in Mendota Golf are nearly identical to the
223
The Minnesota
reasons stated here,” the court of appeals said.
Supreme Court granted review and expects to hear the case in
224
2007.
Chances are that Mendota Golf will have the same effect on
other local governments, providing them with newfound
215. 292 N.W.2d at 257 n.2 (citing Holaway v. City of Pipestone, 269 N.W.2d 28
(Minn. 1978)).
216. See supra note 115 and accompanying text.
217. Id. at 258–59.
218. Mendota Golf, 708 N.W.2d at 182. The court said it did not intend to force
a permanent comprehensive plan designation on the golf course property.
Rather, Mendota Golf and the city were free to discuss and negotiate the use of
the property. Id.
219. Peterson, supra note 10, at 3B.
220. Meggen Lindsay, City Will Fight Subdivision Plan: Council Drops Settlement
With Golf Course, ST. PAUL PIONEER PRESS (Minn.), Jan. 18, 2006, at B1.
221. Wensmann Realty, Inc. v. City of Eagan, No. A05-1074, 2006 WL 1390278,
at *4 (Minn. Ct. App. May 23, 2006), rev. granted (Aug. 15, 2006).
222. Id. at *2.
223. Id.
224. Meggen Lindsay, Carriage Hills Battle Is on Again: State Supreme Court Will
Review Lawsuit, ST. PAUL PIONEER PRESS (Minn.), Aug. 23, 2006, at B1.
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confidence that their planning decisions have sweeping protection
from judicial review. That in turn could lead to either of two
divergent scenarios. In one, golf course owners—bowing to the
municipalities’ solid legal authority—would negotiate with towns to
find mutually acceptable alternatives to unprofitable uses. Or,
municipalities may get carried away, act sloppily or “irrationally”
and provoke developers to press regulatory takings claims. Courts
would be in the unenviable position of discerning when the cities
have, in the takings parlance, “gone too far.”
V. CONCLUSION
Mendota Golf could have been the beginning of the end for
regional planning in the Twin Cities, not to mention a couple of
golf courses in Dakota County. Upholding the mandamus order
against the city would have let the tail (zoning) wag the dog
225
(planning).
The modest
progress toward comprehensive
planning and regionalism could have begun to unravel. Instead,
the supreme court reaffirmed that cities can work within the
regional scheme and craft a vision of their future without fear of
legal attack by developers.
Upholding the legislature’s
commitment to regional planning provides stability to
municipalities and developers alike.
Mendota Golf was not a case where a city ran roughshod over a
developer’s rights. For those occasions, Minnesota still needs a law
that keeps cities from crossing the line from planning to regulatory
taking. Presented with an opportunity to settle precisely where that
line is, Mendota Golf instead deferred the question. The people of
226
Mendota Heights get to decide that their city will stay green.
But
this developer and others could soon return for another swing.

225. Poradek, supra note 70, at 1363.
226. As the time of publication, Mendota Heights took the first steps toward
buying the Par 3 course from Mendota Golf, approving a general letter of intent to
preserve the course. Frederick Melo, Voters Will Decide Whether City Should Buy Golf
Course, ST. PAUL PIONEER PRESS (Minn.), Jan. 19, 2006, at B1. Voters were to be
asked to approve the land’s purchase for $2.79 million in a referendum. Id. A
rejection of the deal, the city’s mayor said, “would mean allowing the current
owners . . . to sell the 17-acre site to a housing developer, or develop it
themselves.” Id.
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